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They must stand like the shepherd, outlasting,
from afar it may seem that he mourns,
coming nearer one feels how he watches.
Rilke
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Purpose Of This Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to ascertain just
exactly what is the spirit which embodies itself
in the visual experiences of the holy, and isol




Lastly, although there was no definite religious
sentiment mingled with it, there was a continual
perception of the Sanctity in the whole of nat
ure, from the slightest thing to the vastest; an
instinctive awe,mixed with delight; an indefin
able thrill, such as we sometimes imagine to in
dicate the presence of a disembodied spirit. I
could only feel this perfectly when I was alone;
and then it would often make me shiver from head
to foot with joy and fear of it, when after being
some time away from the hills I first got to the
shore of a mountain river, where brown water cir
cled among the pebbles, or when I first saw the
swell of distant land against the sunset, or the
first low broken wall, covered with mountain iaoss,
I cannot in the least describe the feeling; but
I do not think that it is my fault , not that of
the English language, for I am afraid no feel
ing is describable. If we had to explain even
the sense of bodily hunger to a person who has
never felt it, we should be hard put to it for
words; and the joy in nature seemed to me to
come of a sort of heart-hunger, satisfied with
the presence of a Great and Holy Spirit....
These feelings remained in their full intensity
till I was eighteen or twenty, and then, as the
reflective and practical power increased, and
the cares of this world gained upon me, faded
gradually away, in the manner described by
Wordsworth in his "Intimations of Immortality".
John Ruskin
( as quoted in Modern Painters, popular edition,
ed. George Allen, vol. iii, p. 309 )
Vll.
If we are to have any transcendence today, even
Christian, it must be in and through the secular.
If we are to have any mystery it must be the lay
mystery. If we are to find grace it is to be
found in the world and not overhead. The sublime
firmament of overhead reality that provided a
spiritual home for the souls of men until the
eighteenth century has collapsed. But this need
be no loss. I take it that we have been learning
this from Bonhoeffer and Gogarten among others.
We must take the world more seriously, nature and
our nature more seriously, history more seriously.
But all this means that the artists and poets
are more important to us even than before. Not
because they preserve for us as was it first
thought a refuge for the dreams and ideals
threatened by materialism. But because the artist
properly deals with the givens, the primordial
givens, of the senses, the affections and the
passions. These still have their transcendence;
even in a one-story world these still have their
theological import. And in the modern situation
this becomes all the more significant; now the be
liever and the artist are dealing with the same
single reality, and the artist is freer in handling
it. By virtue of his craft and his embattled aut
onomy, he presents the voices of nature more direct
ly. The theologian cannot enter so freely into
the modern reality, nor can the conventional relig
ious artist identified with the art sacre of the
past, for they suffer the curvature ana stiffness
of an ancient dualistic gesture. Here is the con
text of Cocteau's phrase. Protesting to the theo
logian Maritain, Cocteau says that the artist must
deal with the lay mystery and that to deal with
it he must be free. But this does not mean that
such art will be immoral or amoral, for, he
writes: "I believe that art reflects morals, and
that one cannot renew oneself without living dan
gerously and attracting
slander." That is, the
artist must deal at first hand with life, beyond
the fences of social or religious propriety.
It is something like this that Wallace ot evens
means when he says of the poet or artist today:
The ephebe is solitary in his walk.
He skips the journalism of subjects,
seeks out
The perquisites of sanctity, enjoys
A strong mind in a weak neighborhood,
and is
A serious man without the serious...
Vlll.
He is neither priest nor proctor...
It is a fresh spiritual that he defines.
The actual landscape with its actual horns
of baker and butcher blowing, as if to hear,
Hear hard, ^;ebs an essential integrity.
...Let us say first, then, that the theologian
can well put himself to school to the modern art
ist to free himself from hang-overs of old fashions
in transcendence. He must do this not only with a
view to better strategies in communication, but
with a view to honesty: honesty of feeling
as-
well
as honesty of language. It is a question of where
today Grace is actually to be found in the old
habits and rhetorics or, as Stevens puts it, in
The actual landscape with its actual horns
Of baker and butcher blowing.
To avoid misunderstanding we might say that
these horns of the butcher and baker relate us
more direo&ly to the ram's horns of the Exodus
and the Seven Trumpets of the Apocalypse than do
ecclesiastical electrical chimes or Christmas
carols piped through loudspeakers in our shopping
centers. The horns of the butcher and baker are
not, of course, the Gospel, but they are real.
Stevens is talking about the primordial givens of





Now we go one step farther. If the artist
often calls theology and piety back to an "ess
ential
integrity,"
one can say that art as a whole,
the aesthetic order, is always an indispensable
corrective and nourishment to faith. Recurrently
threatened by docetism and irrelevance, the Christ
ian faith is in need of recurrent baptism in the
secular, in the human, to renew itself. It has to
be continually re immersed in the vitalities of nature
to be saved from a spurious and phantom Christ. Art
mediates this order of creation to us.
Amos wilder
( "Art and Theological Meaning", from, "The New
Orpheus, essays toward a Christian
poetic,"
ed:




A Study Of The Holy As An Aesthetic Phenomenon
I.
Section I
The Holy Is A Presence
The holy is a presence. The holy is not an es
sence or a person. A person may be an
'it*
or a
?thou' (other) to me. A person as an 'itT is an
object, i.e., third person (he, she, it j . A person
as a
'thou' ( or other ) is a presence to me, i.e.,
second person (you). 'Holy' is the proper name
for the presence of the One who is perfectly, or
'Totally
Other' than me. This One is so perfect
and so Other that His otherness is second person
and third person to me at the same time (i.e., He
is both transcendent and immanent to me ) . This
'Totally
Other' is the power of holiness. Holiness
is His presence to me as other. Holiness is the
power of otherness which resides in all I-thou
relationships. All I-thou relationships communic
ate a sense of ultimate rightness to the extent
that they are integral i.e., to the extent that
they are open to the holy- Only the One, who is
'Totally Other', is the power of
His- own presence.
The holy has been improperly extended in con
ventional language to include certain relationships
which people have with other beings as objects.
For the sake of understanding the holy we shall have
to disentangle some of the conventional errant mean
ings associated with it. The holy is a relationship
of otherness or thouness only. Certain situations
2.
because of their proximity to the holy have come
to be seen as holy in themselves. Rituals of wor
ship and divine commandments are such instances.
Whether or not I kept the external prescription
of the commandment or ritual became the condition
by which I became holy. The legislation became
the end of my activity ( rather than being only a
method to develop my otherness j . Practically
speaking I placed myself in an I-it relationship
to'
the law and it became my god. Legislation, such
as the Hebraic Decalogue, is to be a methodology by
which I may form my sensitivity so as to be capable of
greater otherness. Holiness belongs only to the One
who is 'Totally Other'. We can partake in holiness
to the extent that we become
' for-others'
. A thing
is never holy since it has no otherness by which
holiness might be established. Even a person in a
relationship of otherness cannot be said to be holy.
A person in such a relationship has simply afforded
the chance to the One of extending His presence to
that particular level of creation. Holiness is not
something that resides in things,
a situation can
only be said to be manifesting
holiness when it is
in the actual process of being open to the Totally
Other's presence. The presence of the Other is a
process -which is called holy. This particular
process is what Martin Buber calls the 'I-thou
relationship'. Art, to the extent that it is an
I-thou methodology rather than an I-it methodology,
3.
is a means of theophany ( bringing the One to pres
ence ) .
I am interested in developing opennes^ to the
presence of otherness by art. Art is oy no means
a new method for this purpose. In fact, since the
beginning of time we see art as the main method by
which man developed this openness. We generally
fine the start of civilizations marked with art
that exhibits the marks of the holy. But as the
civilization 'matures' ( ana becomes 'classical' )
we find fewer instances of otherness in what it pro
duces as art. There is something sacred and sav
agely primordial about art formed by thouness
which is excluded from the life of a 'matured'
civilization. Art as a method of otherness is
a consecration of personal being to ultimate Being,
otherness, and transcenaence. It is a pilgrimage,
i.e., never being satisfied with the temporal because
of the ultimate. Art is a spirituality not a mere
decorative craft, and the ultimate ordering principle
for living with other beings ( social existence ) not
a mere product in service to the leisure time activit
ies of an it-culture. Once the holy is no longer
evolved into a culture as the raison
d'
etre of all
that is it exists there only as a caricature of other-
ness. The covenant between Being and being has been
broken by acting other than other. Art that is not
4.
in the service of otherness is in the service of
some I-it relationship. The I-it relationship that
the art is mediating may be a specific religious or
cultural ideology, or a manner of living without a
relationship to otherness, such as the bourgeois.
I-it relationships have generally governed the
way man has moved in the world. Man has been un
willing to permit other beings to reveal .their
otherness socially if it obstructed his domination.
At first men only subjected non-human beings to the
crudity of his lust for power, but as technology
ad-
,
vanced in the service of- temporal manipulation he
also raped the higher beings, as such the beings
of the world have advanced man's manipulative
( i.e., tool making ) capabilities, but not man's
being ( his humanity ) . Consequently we witness
that man has not evolved as a human being yet in
the tool-making stage of his development. He has
better tools and control than had his ape ancestor,
but the way in which he applies them is still the
same. Instead of solving communication difficulties





Itness has so overtaken the way in which the world
is run that thouness hase almost entirely lost a social
dimension. The
'man-product'
of the it-culture has not
5.
developed the capacity for otherness which lies re-
sidually in all being. Otherness is almost totally
forgotten as is the means of developing it. Itness
has so thoroughly been encultured into our methods
of dealing with the beings of this world that the
men born in the great it-cultures may be culturally
incapable of otherness. The resort to violence for
the implementation of humanized reforms in our social
system seems a mark of our inability to be other.
Radical creativity and initiative seem to be detri
ments to anyone who aspires to prominence in our
social systems. Manipulation of the elements of the
status-quo seems to be the only desirable talent in
the great it-systems whether these be systems of
politics, religion, philosophy, or art.
People who have managed a social dimension of
otherness are considered strange, or at best naive
by the it-cultures. The it-culture finds worth in
the other-dimensioned as diversion and illustration
only. The other-dimensioned people are turned into
either
'entertainment'
or 'subversive elements' by
the stereotypes of the it-culture. Otherness is not
used in the running of an it-culture and as such it
is 'irrelevant'. When some person of deep humanity
is born upon the it-culture's horizon he is either
despised, neglected, or accorded such stereotyped
6.
honors that he is rendered socially ineffective by
being 'above' others. Those people who wish a cult
ural dimension for their otherness must debase and
characterize it for the sake of complying with the
leisure-time entertainment wants of the culture...
a world of, grotesque and modulated stereotypes.
There is no diminishing the tendency of counter
cultural dissent to fall prey to the neutralization
that can come from false attention. Those who dis
sent have to be supremely resourceful to avoid get
ting exhibited in somebody's commercial showcase
-- rather like bizarre fauna brought back alive
from the jungle wilds ... by Time, by Esquire, by
David Susskind. On such treacherous terrain, the
chances of miscalculation are immense. Bob Dylan,
who laments the nightmarish corruptions of the
age, nevertheless wears his material thin grinding
out a million-dollar album a year for Columbia
-- which is more apt to find its way to the shelf
beside a mahogany stereophonic radio-phono console
in suburbia than to any bohemian garret....
,From such ,obfuscation of genuine dissenting tal
ent, it isn't far to go before the counter-culture
finds itself swamped with cynical or self-deceived
opportunists who become, or conveniently let them
selves be turned into, spokesmen for youthful dis
affiliation. Accordingly, we now have clothing
designers, hairdressers, fashion magazine editors,
and a veritable phalanx of pop stars who, without
a thought in their heaas their PR man did not put
there, are suddenly expounding "the philosophy of
today's rebellious
youth" for the benefit of the
Sunday supplements. . .the feature to be sandwiched
between a report on luxury underwear and a full-
color spread on the latest undiscovered skin-div
ing paradise at which to spend that summer of a
lifetime. And then for good reason, the counter
culture begins to look like nothing so much as a
worla-wide publicity stunt...
Theodore Roszak
( The Making of a Counter Culture , pp. 70,71,72;
Anchor Books of Doubleday and Co., 1969 )
7.
The it- culture still feels some twinge for
otherness even though it does not recognize it as
such. This latent need for otherness is socially
expressed in the it-culture's superstitious attach
ment to what it supposes art and religion to be.
Because of this need of the it-culture we find
'holy
men'
who are not other-dimensioned, and art
ists who are incompetent of anything more than ill
ustration. Both of these superstitious parodies
of other-directedness serve the function of assuring
the it-culture that whatever it does it is approved
of by the predominant god. Witness the number of
churchmen who take the sides of whatever nation they
are employed by in wars rather than the side of Being
which speaks against all war.
When we speak of otherness we are able to bestow
the title of priest or artist only on those men who
mediate it to others. The artist and the priest are
the mediators of Being to beings. It is no accident
that the artist and priest were fused into one role
at the beginning of time. Indeed, it seems as if Being
meant the priest to be first an artist. It is only
because we have been .culturally and historically .con
ditioned .thatwe, accept the separation of these roles.
It is only because society
is not other-directed that
we believe it is possible to have either religion or
art in the ministry of these men.
These cultural
8.
functionaries mediate only that which is considered
safe for the it-culture and what is considered safe
contains very little if any genuine otherness.
This thesis deals with otherness and the way
in which nan has constructed particular visual
methodologies for its evocation. I am not inter
ested in those artworks that relate to the holy
as an it. We have a long line of art that is in
the service of dogmas rather than the holy. Art
that serves to illustrate dogma is not religious
art properly called. ( Although art may indeed
serve both dogma and the holy if the ordering
principle for the work is the holy which just hap
pens to take the form pertinent to a particular
dogma. I . Religion is a virtue which requires ded
ication based on love. Dogma requires adherence on
the basis of its rationalness . iwhat I can explain
is knowledge, what I believe is faith. To have re
ligion one must first have otherness. Art that is
in the service of otherness is religious by its
nature.
Art history has generally done an unsatisfactory
job of mediating that which is specifically relig
ious ( i.e., otherness ) in art. This is due in
part to the positivistic stance most history takes.
To explore the holy as a visual phenomenon we will
have to consult those people who have mediated
9.
otherness. These people are the mystics, the writers
of the great religious books, poets, philosophers, etc.
The artists have generally been with man through recent
history but the philosophers of otherness are new to
the scene. After almost three thousand years of
thinking about being to the exclusion of Being
philosophy has again taken up its primeval task of
evolving Being into man's language and thought.
Because the thinkers of Being are finally here
there is some glimmer of hope that perhaps now




Otherness Demands Altogetherness For Presence
Man is essentially the being which is corespon
dent with Being. Man is not his own end, suffic
ient unto himself. He is the "shepherd of Being";
he "belongs to Being"; he exists solely "for the
sake of Being". He is "called by
Being" in order
that Being may reveal itself to him, and "apart
from this truth of Being man himself does not mat
ter". It is Heidegger's conviction that man's dig
nity, his greatest glory, lies simply in his abid
ing as the locus of Being's self-revelation. Man's
true vocation is to be contemplative. Insteau he
has become a mere user-of-things.
Giles Driscoll
( "Heidegger: A Response To Nihilism", Philosophy
Today, Vol. XI,no.l, p. 21, 1967 )
Originally art was used as a method of exor
cising the dread early man felt
before the Other.
Early man felt the weight of Being in almost every
thing. He felt it in storms, rivers, forests,
animals, strangers,
the night. Early man saw every
thing as having a personality. He
saw storms as
theophanic manifestations of a powerful being's
will. He believed that the brooding darkness of
the primeval forests was a mark of
the forest's




s life aelineating his feeling of contin
gency on a
higher power. Man sought to gain some
control over the
actions of this higher power by
ritualistic appeasement.
The natural dread that
11.
the primeval surroundings evoked in man was proof
enough of the existence of this all-powerful
being. To appease, and so control, the all-power
ful Other man fashioned a unique manner of commun
ication. The dread felt before the presence of the
Other laid man's soul nakea and evoked a natural,
automatic, and necessary response from man. This
response was art. An art which was evoked by the
Presence of the Other from the deepest core of
man's being. The dread of the Other was exorcised
from early
man'
s awe-struck soul in a natural re
coiling action which produced an external form
an artifact. Man felt a natural necessity to dis
tance himself from the presence of the dreadful
by art. Ordinary language could not expel the
Other's presence because it could not grasp the
essential nature of dread, namely, otherness.
Art was not only able to enter into a relationship
of otherness, but was automatically evoked by dread.
Art was a primordial!y fashioned method of commun
ication that allowed man and the Other to respond
to each other's presence.
But man gradually became aware that he could ex
orcise the presence of the Other in another manner.
Man found that he could exorcise otherness from his
own being thus being
incapable of experiencing the
dread he so feared. The Other came suddenly without
12.
apparent warning. The Other's presence in dread
was either there or not, and if it was there it
was there in the full strength of its dreadfulness,
Kan, contrariwise, was not always 'altogether'.
Man's consciousness was extended over the plural
ity of his daily affairs. His consciousness was
fragmented by the necessity of dealing with the
'stuff of surviving. In order to build a life
style of material efficiency on this earth man
gradually immersed himself into I-it activity
to the exclusion of I-thou activity. Man ceased
being as
'altogether'
as he once was. The I-it
act is the basis of technology. Man directed
his new found technologies to the purpose of
enhancing his I-it relationship to the material
world and thus became gradually less culturally
able to experience otherness as technology took
the place of other-sensitivity in his life.
Otherness requires that the participants deal with
each other in the stggkly honest confrontation
between their beings, a technology aoes not help
in controlling the Other but it does help in
blunting man's sensitivity to the Other. Other
ness requires that the participants be altogether
while technology ( in the service of the I-it re
lation. ) demands fragmentation.
Nature was no longer seen as an occasion for
theophany. Nature was gradually no longer
rever-
13.
enced, but raped, man's tools, directed as they
were toward the making of products ( insteaa of
man j , limited his understanding una sensitivity
to otherness in other beings. Technology was cor
roding man's ability to be other.
There were still vast areas though, in which
man had not invented technologies capable of dis
pelling otherness. These last vestiges of otherness
became the realm of magic and superstition. Man was
able to organize the meaning of the events that tran
scended his control by technologizing religion and
art. He made his religion into a stereotyped system
of repeatable rituals and convenient dogmas. He
made his art into that realm where madness and other
manifestations could be tolerated without damage to
the growing it-culture. Hence religion served to de
void the Other of a voice, and art was placed so that
otherness could not be effective socially. A great
happening such as a natural disaster which evoked
otherness was mediated to the masses through the
it-culture's religion as proof that the Other stood
behind 'his' government on some policy. The Other
had lost the possibility of speaking to man because
man had managed to seal off his culture from other
ness. God, the Other, was dead. In fact though, it
was not Being that died, but
'human' being. Man had
14.
become culturally incapable of otherness, and
hence of awe, wonder, and art. To be an other
in today's contemporary cultures takes immense
psychic and physical energy. Most men do not have
that type of energy or direction. Most men's other
ness is now present only in that ever shortening
period before their culture starts transforming
them i.e, their childhood. Children are al
lowed to wonder, but men are to be only curious.
People were bringing little children to him, for
him to touch them. The disciples turned them away.
but when Jesus saw this he was indignant and said
to them, 'Let the little children come to me; do
not stop them; for it is to such as these that the
kingdom of God belongs. I tell you solemly, anyone
who does not welcome the kingdom of God like a
little child will never enter it.' Then he put
his arms around them, laid his hands on them and
gave them his blessing.
Mark 10: 13-16
It has taken man many centuries to understand
that he has killed god by fragmenting his own other
ness. Man was practicing technological exorcism of
otherness with relative unconsciousness for many cent
uries. Reality was narrowed to include only that
which was measurable.
Otherness gradually became
unreal and was denied existence in the it-culture.
Otherness became a type of pyschological disease
which could be treated by new techniques each year
to bring the person back
to 'normality'. Creativity
15.
became an aberration unless it was harnessed to the
augmentation of some acceptable 'product'. Having a
sense of one's own being and destiny became having
a 'messianic complex'. Otherness has become 'outlaw'.
Only children and lovers, both subjects of
passing 'phases', are still permitted feelings of
wonder and awe in our culture without serious social
consequences. This is because technical man knows
that the lover or the child will ' out grow' this un
realistic understanding of life. But technical man
has been stung by the waste of time by both the lover
and the child in their 'naivete' and 'unproductive
ness'
. Technical man is in the process of inventing
new techniques to make the wasted time ( the ambiance
of wonder ) of love and childhood into productive
periods productivity that will relate the child and
lover more efficiently to the it-culture. A legion
of sex manuals has been issued in order that the sex
ual acts of the lovers might be more pleasurable. And
Masters and Johnson have devised a means by which we
can
'measure' the intensity of the
'pleasure'
so that
we can be more
'scientific'
about 'loving'. Technic
al man has also designed toys that
'teach'
so that
the child does not
'waste' his time in unproductive
fantasy... which might ruin, his delicate psychic
balance. Love and childhood is approved of to the






extent that love or childhooa is simply wonderful it
is counter-productive to the it-culture. In fact,
Orwell's 1984 outlaws love for its counter-produc
tive effects. Loving has been absorbed into the it-
culture by making it that area where man can 'let
off
steam'
so that he can come back to his job and
be more effective. Increasingly a wife's role is
that of 'mistress' rather than mother ( since child
ren are liabilities to the territorial imperative )
or compaimion ( since a wife cannot talk about mean
ingful things with her husband as she does not share
the same job he does ) . The commercial market is
flooded with cosmetics by which the ordinary woman
may technically aspire to look like this year's
ideal woman. In short, woman has lost her social
dimension as a human being.
Art has also been thoroughly technologized
exorcised of otherness. Art making is subject to the
responsibilities of making a
'proper'
object some
thing that is 'tasteful'. Art making is subject to
the responsibilities of being a
'proper' investment
-- it must be durable so that :When.<~it .1 is put ' in
the vaults it will holu and increase its value. Art
making is subject to
various ideologies it is to
be an
'accurate' expression of a world-view. The
political left uses art to illustrate its hopeless
adolescence,
while the political right uses it to
17.
glamorize the status-quo. Art is subject to the re
sponsibilities of being 'uecent' entertainment
it must have 'socially redeeming qualities'. But
the one thing that art is no longer subject to in
this society is Being, without Being there is no
art. There are only various species of illustrating
the inside of our technological ghetto.
Otherness is a lost dimension for technological
man. It is the absence of otherness that makes our
culture's understanding of art, religion, love, and
childhood false. Otherness is the mode in which
man's spirit is evoked, matured, inflamed. The
element which makes us essentially different than
the apes is that we can rationally evolve others
ness into our social life. Yet moot men lack even
the social evolution of the apes in this area. We
have only become a better species of tool-making ape.
The it-culture exorcised otherness in a i'airly
unconscious manner in general. But there was a con
scious eroding of those elements which made other
ness viable in the culture. This conscious erosion
started with the degeneration of the understanding of
myth to fact and reached its early high point in the
-invention of
'idea'
by Plato. It is necessary to loc
ate the growth of the
it-culture as closely as possible
in order that we have a
better perspective on the place
of otherness in the contemporary
world.
18.
As the spell of scientific or quasi-scientific
thought has spread in our culture from the phy
sical to the so-called behavioral sciences, and
finally to scholarship in the arts and letters,
the marked tendency has been to consign whatever
is not fully and articulately available in the
waking consciousness for empirical or mathemat
ical manipulation, to a purely negative catch
all category ( in effect, uie cultural garbage
can ) called the "unconscious"
-. .or the "irrat
ional"... or the "purely subjective". To behave .
on the basis of such blurred states of coriocious-
ness is at best to be some species of amusing ec
centric, at worst to be plain mad. Conversely,
behavior that is normal, valuable, productive,
mentally healthy, socially respectable, intellect
ually defensible, sane, decent, and practical is
supposed to have nothing to do with subjectivity.
When we tell one another to "be reasonable", to
"talk sense", to "get down to brass tacks", to
"keep one's feet on the ground", "to stick to the
facts", to be "realistic", we mean that one should
avoid talking about one's
"inner" feelings and look
at the world rather in the way an engineer looks
at a construction project or a physicist views the
behavior of atomic particles. We feel that worth
while things come of such a state of mind know
ledge, solutions to problems, successful projects,
money, power whereas only some manner of un
productive self-indulgence comes of wallowing in
"mere feelings". The more sophisticated may admit
the legitimacy of allowing artists to moon and day
dream. But the world, as every practical man knows,
can do without poems and paintings; it can scarcely
do without dams and roads and bombs and sound policy,
Art is for the leisure hours: the time left over
from dealing with realities and necessities.
Theodore Roszak
( The Making Of a Counter Culture,
p. 53 )
The more we delineate the absence of the other
and the reasons why the other
is absent the more we
will prepare for the




Truth As It And Truth As Other
Introduction
Art alone can enable our consciousness to live
out its irrealization in a world which belongs
to it, and to it alone. From Siger de Brabant
to Bacon, from Descartes to Hegel, Western tho
ught has succumbed to the Greek compulsion to
establish at any cost an enclosed form, to con
found being and knowing, to do away with tran
scendence.
The great moment has come to escape from
the two successive bottlenecks of Socrates and
of the positivist rationalization of experience.
A metaphysics of liberty is being supersed
ed by a metaphysics of vacuum, of risk, of de
tachment and finally of emergence, in which a
dynamic ana contradictory duality of cosmos and
chaos becomes the essence of Being.
After seven centuries during which the quest
for evidence has hidden truth from us, our West
ern world is finding the road to its veritable
vocation. Never has there been such good reason
to hope for the best.
Georges Mathieu
( A Critical Anthology Of The Art Of Painting In
The Twentieth Century, ed. Seghers arid Charpier,
Hawthorne Books Inc., 1965 . p. 286 )
What has happened? What is at work in the work
of art? Revelation, aletheia,
: truth. A work of
art does not so muca reveal
what this or that
individual thing is as it
discloses to us the es
sential nature and
structure of the whole world.
The simpler, the purer,
the more primordial and
unadorned the work, the more immediately
and in
evitably it
does so. In its way, the work of art
opens up the Being
of what is. This opening up
or disclosure is
the happening of truth. The
essence of the work of
art is thus the unfolding




and Truth, 1966 )
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a:irt is the 'happening of truth' but, truth no
longer happens in Western thought it is produc
ed. Truth, aletheia. and art are inseparable in
the experience of otherness. The fate of truth
in Western thought also affects the fate of art.
For this reason we now study how aletheia ( the
type of truth proper to otherness ) was banished
from the relationships which men have. Aletheia
is the concern of this thesis because it is the
type of truth that is present in the holy. To
treat the loss of aletheia is to explore the
path taken by the disappearing holy. It is nec
essary to explore the type of truth relationships
that are viable in the it-culture if we are to
propose alternatives.
The following quote sets the stage for the dis
appearance of the holy by introducing both partici
pants ( aletheia and eidos ) and their relationship.
What was the relationship between Being and idea in
Greek thought prior to Plato? According to Heidegger
the Greeks originally experienced Being as physis,
as "the power that
emerges" in that which is. Physis
was Being encountered as emerging from concealment,
as spontaneously unfolding itself and lingering; it
was the over-powering shining-forth of Being from
beings. Physis was Being as it initially blazed
forth from the phainomenon in a splendor of
hidaen-
ness (aletheia) . This shining-forth was a
standing-
forth-in-the-light; it was an appearing. Appearance
belonged to Being itself; appearance lay in the very
essence of Being. Being meant appearing. Here, ap
pearance was understood
not in the sense of a mere
seeming, but
as a coming-to-preoence. For something
to appear was for it to
expose itself in its Being.
It was such appearance that
the earlier Greeks called
eidos or idea. Idea was the shining
of the Being of
beings. Being disclosed
itself as eidos and idea.
S- ' -'' ' (cont.)
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Appearance, or idea, was "a definite mode of emerg
ing sell -manifestation," i.e., of physis. Idea, then,
was a or determination of Being.
This understanding of idea altered in Plato's
philosophy where physis gave way to idea as the dom
inant interpretation of Being. The idea, as the ap
pearance of the being, "came to constitute its
what,"
i.e., its essence. Idea, as whatness, be
came the Being of the being; it became that which
was most Beingful in the being. Idea, which had
originally been the appearing of being as illum
inated by Being, came to be construed as the whole
of Being. Idea became the one-only locus of Being.
Being, as idea or essence, was then separated from
the being; the on became distinct from the phain-
omenon. The phainomenon, devoid of Being ceased
to be regarded as that which appears, that, which
reveals itself, and was now looked upon as mere
appearance, i.e., as semblance and unreality.
Being, conceived solely ab stable, unchanging
idea, was exalted by Platonism to a suprasensory
realm "somewhere on high," and at the same time
the phenomenal world was degraded and declared
to be one of mere appearance, an only seeming
world. Man was dwelling in a fleeting, ephem
eral world of becoming or non-Being a world
of sensible things which shared in Being only to
the extent that they were in some way illuminated
by, or assimilated to, eternal essences which
alone were fully real but which existed in a
world apart from the phenomenal....
Giles Driscoll
( "Heidegger: A Response To Nihilism", Philosophy
Today, Vol.XI,n.l, Spring 1967, pp. 18-19 )
Descartes told Western man that the most certain
thing he could
know was his own thinking process. In
doing so Descartes
rendered anything outside of his
own process 'suspect'.
Kant told Western man that he
could not know anything in
itself. Descartes elimin
ated the presence of
otherness and Kant eliminated
the source of
otherness. Shortly afterwards Niet
zsche
declared' the possibility of otherness to be
dead... and the
twentieth century proved it.
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Descriptions of Aletheia
We must rely on a description of experiences
of aletheia rather than a definition of them.
Aletheia is incarnated truth and as such is as
broad as carnate reality. Aletheia is also the
way of otherness and as such is larger than me.
Because aletheia is broader and higher than me
I cannot set limits on.it. .( i.e. , define)..!-, to under
stand it. Aletheia must be described by my being
part of it. This is the reason why only -artists
can mediate aletheia and why we are here dependent
upon a poem to describe it to us.
The Rising
You are so beautiful I don't know where to look.
1 am ashamed.
Like the unspeakable name of God,
bitter and new,
naked even of pleasure.
Julia Vinograd
( The Young American Poets,
ed. Carroll, A Big
Table Book, lyotf, p. 460)
Beauty is not a
comfortable experience in this
poem. Beauty is a quality
of the other that makes
me feel ashamed. Beauty
is the name that is evoked
from a human being to
describe the revelation of
otherness in aletheia.
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In experiences of episteme. which are the dom
inant mode of beauty in our culture, beauty is that
which 'comforts' or 'conforms' to my feelings of
how things 'should' appear. An episteme exper
ience of beauty is reassuring -- it does not chal
lenge the status-quo. An aletheia experience of
beauty challenges all that is not in the process of
evolving ultimate value in my
' being-in-the-world'
.
Aletheia conjures guilt from my being for not being
more other. Lpisteme congratulates my being for
being less other.
The experience of beauty in this poem is a
loving experience ( hence one of aletheia and
otherness ) . The poetess cannot be objective
about the one she is describing in the poem since
she is not an object to that one, but a subject.
The poetess can only describe the inward progress
of deepening communion with the other by the poem.
The lack of episteme objectiveness is a mark of
the presence of aletheia. Aletheia has its rectit
ude from being open to the other, while episteme
has its from a closed, systematic ordering of
knowledge-objects. The lack of epistemological
order in experiences of aletheia
incites the poet
ess to wonder, awe,
and the completion of the poem
in her life. The lack of
epistemological order for
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the epistemologist in aletheia experiences leads him
to discount them as 'strange', 'wierd' , and 'incongru
ous'
.
In episteme experiences of beauty the artifact
is seen as an expression of the viewer's or the art
ist's world. The artist is considered meritorious
to t he extent that he has either correctly anticip
ated and.id expressed the conventionalized sensit
ivities of his audience, or sold the audience his
world as a piece of the culture market. In both in
stances otherness is forsaken in the relationship
between the artist and the audience. Episteme art
is illustration. Illustration deals with two known
elements. We know what the object is that we are
weaving a mystique around, and we know how to use
our art stereotypes to portray explicit and implicit
value judgments about the object to the viewer. Il
lustration is a form of propaganda explicitly or im
plicitly. An illustration may strike us as being
'objective' just a matter of information but
that piece of information orients
us to a social struc
ture that makes meaning out of
thao sign. By accept
ing the sign we are accepting
the structure that con
veys the meaning of the
sign. The meaning struc
ture out of which the
sign arises has been illustrat
ed to us implicitly.
<e have been captured by the
conventional.
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In aletheia experiences of beauty the struc
ture of the artifact is determined by the presence
of the other. We don't have to construct convent
ional structures on which to hang the presence of the
other so as to make sense out of it as we try to
do in illustration. The other is immediately mean
ingful and true in its presence. The meaning for
the presence of the other does not have to be con
ventionally established as it is already
primord-
ially present in human 'being'. The lack of under
standing for art in our culture is not because of the
new forms and directions which art has taken but rather,
because man is no longer in contact with his own hum
an 'being'. Man is no longer capable enough of other
ness to allow Being to resonate in his human 'being'.
Our culture has so fragmented man that hardly anything
can reach his humanity.
When aletheia strikes us it opens our human
'being' to Being. Our human
'being' is awed at the
presence of Being and ashamed of its own wasted op
portunities to be more like Being. Aletheia is
bitter and new for man. An experience of otherness
is not comfortable since it
judges us and lets us
feel the weight of the
distance we have yet to grow.
We have consulted a
poetess for a description
of aletheia. Now we
will consult a philosopher
who is trying to
again give birth to Being in
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conventional language.. The German philosopher
Martin Heidegger has brought the relationship of
aletheia and art to the foreground in contemporary
thinking. His thinking is summarized by Laszlo
Versenyi in his book Heidegger, Being, and Truth
of 1966. The following is excerpted from the book.
Delivering us from the yoke of custom and convent
ion, art transports us into a new realm: that of
essential truth, the disclosure of Being. Art
gives no knowledge for or impetus toward control
ling the things of the world we are so fatally
involved with. Rather, 'it changes our usual re
lationships to the world' and arrests our everyday
public existence, lifts us ecstatically out of our
obliviousness to the essential, and makes us suc
cumb to and dwell in the original disclosure of
Being. This alone accounts for the fact that art
is characterized by beauty. For beauty is not a
matter of pleasing some sort of special aesthetic
sense. Aesthetics as a particular discipline among
others can never say .what beauty is .... To be
beautiful in Greek, as wel as in German, means
to shine, gleam, blaze forth, to appear
in the
light, to be revealed in
one's essential nature,
to be disclosed in one's true Being. Beauty is
disclosure. That is why Being and beauty belong
together. For Being is that which is most dis
closed, the
ground of all disclosure, disclosure
itself as such. Beauty, Being, and Truth are but
so many names for




There are two dominant types of episteme ex
periences in our culture. The 'objective' use of
ejjisteme is 'classicism'. The 'subjective' use of
episteme is 'technology'. We have looked at epist
eme as a form of the I-it relationship in an earl
ier section of this paper, we have also drawn some
distinctions between episteme and aletheia as
they change the nature of what we call beautiful.
Consequently, it seems that it will suffice in this
section to merely define episteme and then give
its two dominant cultural manifestations expression.
ep.i.ste.me / ( Gk episteme understanding, knowledge,
fr. fern, of epistemon understanding,
knowing, fr. epistanai to understand,
know, fr. epi and histanai to set,
place more at Stand ) : Knowledge;
specif: intellectually certain know
ledge.
Episteme does not admit to open-ended situations.
Consequently episteme is unable to express otherness.
we do not involve our whole being in the epistemolog
ical knowing process as we do in aletheia.
we are
not present to the known as an other
but as the direct
or of an epistemological
system of conventionalized
meanings. Since we are not
present as other neither
is that to which we are addressing
our epistemolog
ical system. We must
siphon off the otherness that
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makes each being unique so that the being in quest
ion will fit the pre-formed categories of epistem-
ology. We gain knowledge of the shell the being in
habits only. The being we are knowing epistemologic-
ally ceases to be a being and becomes an object to us.
We can have precise epistemological knowledge because
we have excluded that realm which transcends episteme
from the realm of the knowable. In epistemological
knowing we assign the hierarchies of value to the be
ings being known. In aletheia knowing ( or poesis )
the other reveals its value to us. The being we
know in aletheia has its own living principle of
ordering its material characteristics that
epist-
emology is not able to cope with. Consequently,
epistemology rapes being of its otherness for the
sake of its temporal quantification. . .
Epistemology is a neutral element as far as
being is concerned. When epistemology is a positive
enhancement of Being it is directed by aletheia.
In this paper I have been using episteme as if it
were a detriment to Being since the way our culture
uses it makes it so. The two prime detrimental uses




'technology'. These are two
examples of how cont
emporary man
refuses to let Being be in beings.
Epistemology must be
ordered and directed by aletheia




Heidegger lists idea, parade i ana, homoiosis and
mimesis as being the basic concepts behind clas
sicism "assimilation, accommodation, orientation
by" in a word: imitation. Classicism, under
stood in the broadest and most naive sense, would
encompass, bhen, every cultural movement charact
erized by the infusing of value into realities by
way of approximating them to some objective ideal
-- be it an ideal inherited from antiquity, one
revealed from above, or simply a crudely Platonic
'Idea in the sky'. Classicism, so conceived, in
cludes every major cultural tendency of Western
civilization previous to the Enlightenment. Hell
enism, scholasticism and Gothicism, the humanism
of the Renaissance all fall within the ambit
of classicism. So also do the Romanticisms of
the past two centuries.
Giles Driscoll
( "Heidegger: A Response To Nihilism", p. 19-20 )
The appearance of episteme as classicism re
lies on the person who is doing the imitating having
an ideal. The classicist does not
let Being be in
beings since this would destroy his manipulation of
those same beings in the
service of his ideal. The
man who has enough power
to force other beings to
become parts of his ideal
has taken the place of
Being. That man is playing
god. But as Nietzsche
told us,
" God is dead... Long live the
Superman'."
The presence of
otherness has no place in a
society
which does not let Being
be in beings. At












Technology differs from classicism in one
major respect. In classicism there is an ideal
which is 'objective', i.e., 'out there', 'beyond
the individual who has given himself to it'. In
technology there is no ideal. Technology consid
ers any 'out there' to be either irrelevant or
not real. The classical man despoils beings of
their presence by manipulating them in the ser
vice of some iueal. The technological man des
poils beings of their presence by manipulating
them according to his own will. Classicism im
poses the restraints of the ideal on the person
who holds it. Technology imposes no restraint other
than power. If the technologist is powerful enough
he may conceivably dominate all other beings in the
world and airect them to the extension of his will.
Classicism recognizes the existence of Being
but fails to let Being be in beings. Technology
does not recognize that Being has any right to
existence in beings. The ethical ramifications of
this are immense. The classical man had a sense of
honor and integrity even though it might have been
severely
limited by his idealized idea of man and
action. Technological man
has nothing to bolster
integrity or honor
since there is nothing outside
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of his own will that has relevance to his action
unless the outside element is more physically
powerful. The morality of the technological man
or nation is that of the majority or public opin
ion. Public opinion in the technological societies
is conditioned to give positive responses to success
measured in quantative terms. A good example of a-
technological success conditioning public opinion in
favor of the power that used the technology to gain
the success is the nuclear bomb. We should despise
not only the use of this deadly bomb but the invention
of it, and the perverted mentality that sees it as a
benefit for mankind. Instead we 'won' the war with
its use, 'saved the
world' from communism with its
presence, and 'maintain
peace'
by its threat. All
of these atrocities of the bomb parade under the ban
ner of humanitarian success. The technologist has no
honor or integrity other than what the limits of his
technical power make.. Public opinion, probably one of
the last restraints on the use of power by an indiv
idual, is now aole to be conditioned to accept al
most any action. The only morality
that is present
ly viable in a technological society
is that which is
useful for technological
efficiency. Morality which
is not technically efficient
is said to be 'super
stitious'
or
'retrogressive' and hence void. We have




The Relevance Of The Holv
The holy is the presence of the other. Being
is the power source of all otherness. It is nec
essary to start with Being if we are to construct
an alternative manner of living to the one our
technological culture has given us. Art is the
natural place to start to build a counter culture
based on the presence of Being. Art is Being's
effective presence to beings. It is no accident
that the first priests and prophets were artists.
The effective mediation of Being to beings demanded
a mediator who could mold material existence to
reveal otherness.
Unfortunately the artist-priest-prophet iden
tity has been excluded from our technological world.
Today we see those people known
as priests in our
culture generally lending ethical support to
the
rationalized atrocities of the technological culture.
Seldom do those who are now
called priests give Being
a voice through their
actions. Indeed the present
day minister of
religion belongs to the society rather
than to Being. If and
when a minister of religion
gives his voice to Being he
incurs some type of social
reprimand. As we have
seen earlier Being is not only
unwelcome but detrimental
to the productivity of our
it-culture. It is painfully
apparent why the relig
ious department of a
technological society is not
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in the service of Being. The loss of Being has
also meant that art, prophecy, and religion are
no longer connected and mutually deepened in our
it-culture. The loss of Being means that the it-
culture has lost ultimate direction and meaning.
Unfortunately for human 'being' when a man does
give himself to Being for beings he almost auto
matically excludes his effectiveness in the social
life of his culture.
The artist has also suffered from his alienation
from Being. The artist incurs a position in the it-
culture at the expense of his role as priest and
prophet. The effect.; of this alienation from Being
and consequent loss of priesthood and prophecy for
the artist is that he becomes nothing more than some
type of illustrator. The artist loses the depth and
meaning that only Being can grant him when he becomes
established in the technological culture.
The prophet has also hit upon hard times with
the loss of Being. Our it-culture thinks that prop
hecy is some species of fortune telling. In reality
a prophet's role has to do more with the past than
with the future. The prophet is the one who calls
his society back to
the essentials of being human.
The prophet warns his people/ that
unless they re
pent of their neglect of Being they
will suffer
the consequences of their
present actions in the
o
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future. The prophecy in some contemporary philosophy
and art is culturally non-viable because it is in
the service of Being and the culture is in the ser
vice of technology. For the comfort of the prophet
and the discomfort of the it-society, it must be
noted that prophets are usually not heeded until after
the devastation they predicted actually happened.
For the consideration of all of us it must be noted
that if bhe current prediction of doom actually takes
place there will probably be no afterwards in which
we may review our neglected prophecies.
If we are to establish human
'being' in our culture
we must must first establish the presence of Being in
society. The presence of Being to beings is holy.
The holy is the presence of
otherness. Being and
Other are different methodology's
names for the same
presence as has been indicated in this
paper. The
mode of Being to beings in society
is the artist-
priest-prophet. This social mode of Being is
the
'shepherd of Being'.
Before Being's presence may
be present to beings
men must give
themselves over to
otherness in the role of
artist-priest-prophet.
The task of these
'shepherds of
Being' is then to
make paths by which Being
can be in, with, and
through
beings. In short the
task of the
shepherds is that
of making men holy by
letting Being
be for them.




immensely difficult because modes of otherness
have almost been
completely removed from our
culture. Otherness modes were attacked from a
twofold position. First aletheia was lost to man,
and then man lost his ability to be an integral
being. As we have seen, man must be integrally
human before he can uiscover otherness and be open
to aletheia. By concerning ourselves with aletheia
modes of human integration we will be dislodging the
cornerstone of the technological society. Technol
ogical society is based on episteme and the frag
mentation of human 'being' into 'jobs'. The making
of Being present in beings is the start of the
gentle revolution of the holy.
Making men into participants of Being demands
more than just the absence of the technological soc
iety. Man is not the noble savage. An alternative
culture based on integral human 'being' and aletheia
must be established if we are to escape the cultural
cycles of the tool-maker ape. We do not need and
probably cannot afford another
cycle of technically ,
improved societies. For the sake of human
'being'
we
must have a society based on Being.






Cultural systems are nuetral. They may
be either
humane or inhumane depending upon
the humanity of the
36.
men who administer them. To evolve human 'being' one
must evolve Being in beings first.
I am trying to establish grounds for the intel
lectual espousal of Being by my readers in this paper.
The remainder of this paper deals with my work in
the service of making Being more socially viable in
my art. Both my intellectual investigations and my
art exist for the establishment of otherness. My
explorations of Being will gain depth and effective
ness to the extent that my own human
' being-in-the-
world'
admits to more otherness. Otherness is the
power of the holy. In the final analysis the art
of Being is man's natural spirituality. and the art
ist is Being's natural priest-prophet.
